The Third World War: August 1985 Page 12

  A very highly classified planning document, given a strictly limited circulation in the Kremlin in October 1983, which fell into Allied hands after the fighting was over, throws a sufficiently clear light on Soviet policy in relation to NATO to justify the inclusion of a summary of it here.

  Subject: Removal of the threat from NATO to the security of the USSR in Europe.

  This could be achieved in the following way.

  Rapid military defeat of AFCENT, with the simultaneous elimination of AFNORTH and AFSOUTH, followed by an advance to a voluntary stop-line: Hook of Holland-Nijmegen-Maastricht-Saarbrucken-Trier-the Rhine-Basel. The intention of the USSR to stop on this line without entering French territory will have been made abundantly clear worldwide. It is assumed that a government of the Popular Front will continue to be in power in France when the action takes place and that, in spite of not unimportant differences between France and the USSR, there will be sufficient reluctance on the part of the French to become involved in hostilities with the Soviet Union to ensure an adequate response to the pressures that can be brought to bear. It can therefore be expected, though of course not guaranteed, that French forces will not participate in these operations.

  Once the FRG has been totally occupied its neutralization can be put in hand on the usual lines under accepted procedures. The complete collapse of the North Atlantic Alliance can be confidently expected to follow from its failure to prevent this from happening. Bilateral negotiations can then be opened with the USA. Other ex-allies can for the time being be ignored.

  A firm decision to act along these lines will only be taken in the light of the prevailing situation and in relation to all other relevant developments, though complete military plans will be kept up to date for this contingency in itself. Nevertheless, certain factors bearing on choice of time should be kept in mind.

  A resounding military victory over the West, followed by the dismantling of the FRG and the collapse of the Atlantic Alliance, will reinforce Soviet hegemony within the Warsaw Pact and weaken divergent national socialist movements outside it. Current tendencies suggest the advisability of achieving this fairly soon. It might be unwise to delay it beyond 1987.

  NATO countries have recently initiated some improvements in ‘defensive’ preparedness. These are at present modest, but the maintenance of the same rate of expansion will in time set constraints on Soviet freedom of action. In five years’ time the achievement of the military objective will be considerably more difficult.

  Although it has been consistently and warmly denied in the West, we think there are plans to open offensive operations at some time against the Warsaw Pact with an attack on the German Democratic Republic. The Federal Republic is clearly having considerable difficulty in overcoming the reluctance of some of the Allies but might still succeed in staging an attack not later than 1986. The policy of ‘forward defence’ makes no sense from a military point of view unless it involves action well to the east of the frontier, and it can be taken as no more than a cloak for the planning of an invasion of the GDR, possibly already far advanced.[1]

  China does not yet present the major military threat which can be certainly expected to develop later. NATO must be reduced before this. What requires urgent attention now, however, is the Chinese action, with powerful US support, to stimulate dissidence in the Asiatic republics. This is sharply on the increase. It would appear that unless the question of NATO can be resolved before the autumn of 1986 a deteriorating security situation in the Military Districts of Central Asia and the Far East, and possibly in those of Siberia and the Trans-Baikal as well, might offer distraction from Europe and considerable temptation to the FRG to exploit the position.

  There would thus clearly be advantage in action to eliminate the FRG and ensure the collapse of the Atlantic Alliance not later than the summer of 1986. The course of events, particularly in the light of a possible requirement to intervene in Yugoslavia, may compel earlier action, and arrangements for mobilization will, of course, be kept under constant review.

  The greatest relative advantage to the West, as NATO studies confirm, will be if the Warsaw Pact can spend fourteen days in the mobilization process as against seven days for NATO. It should not be difficult to use summer exercises to conceal the first seven days. The utmost use will have to be made of deception arrangements, nevertheless, to indicate, once we are seen to be mobilizing for a possible attack, a date for it later than any that might be chosen.

  In spite of some recent improvement in NATO’s state of readiness, including arrangements to deploy two to four additional divisions in an emergency, further reinforcing formations cannot be expected to arrive in the European theatre, once hostilities have started, before D+16 at the earliest. Naval and air interdiction can be expected to reduce, but not entirely destroy, their effectiveness. It will be important to secure the stop-line before the arrival of major reinforcements.

  Even more important, in the matter of duration of operations, is the question of nuclear release. The USSR will make it clear beyond any possible doubt that use of radiation to any significant degree in offensive weapons of war will be regarded as an open invitation to discard all restraints on nuclear warfare. Escalation into strategic exchange, to use the Western mode of expression, will certainly follow battlefield applications.

  There will unquestionably be doubts and hesitations in the Alliance over the initiation of nuclear release. Widespread unwillingness to allow the use of battlefield weapons on Federal territory can be counted on in the FRG, for the effect of battlefield weapons there would only differ in degree from that of strategic attack on the homelands of the USSR and USA. The USSR can count at the outset on a high superiority in non-nuclear capability. This would be largely offset if battlefield nuclear weapons were introduced. It would therefore be foolish in the extreme for the USSR to resolve NATO’s doubts on their introduction by introducing them first.

  The earlier that military operations in Europe can be brought to a successful conclusion the lower will be the probability of the neutralization of Warsaw Pact conventional superiority by the arrival of major reinforcements or the introduction of nuclear weapons. The conclusion from a close study of all these considerations is that the stop-line should be reached not later than the evening of D + 9. The military plan will be framed accordingly.

  The essence of the military plan to implement this policy, which can now be recognized as of quite unique importance in the study of the Third World War, has been distilled from captured documents and is summarized below. It deserves careful consideration.

  Invasion from a standing start from normal locations, though attractive, is for ground forces of the Warsaw Pact not practicable. Even with exercise cover, and with an excuse for military movement in the shape of real or imaginary internal security difficulties in satellite countries, it would not be possible to count on complete surprise. Some degree of precautionary preparation on the part of NATO would have to be counted on. This could be expected to include the flying-in of the personnel of certainly one heavy division from the United States to marry up with its pre-positioned equipment, and possibly of two, and the partial deployment to its emergency positions of much of AFCENT, including the Dutch and Belgian corps in NORTHAG and some of the entirely new II British Corps. It would also include the alerting of air defences. NORTHAG continues to offer the most attractive point of decisive entry, in spite of the lack of depth in the CENTAG sector, because of the inadequacy of reserves to fight the battle in depth which will inevitably develop in the NORTHAG sector. Forward deployment (adopted in the FRG for purely political reasons) has made a main thrust against NORTHAG particularly inviting.

  The cover plan must firmly indicate a date for the opening of the offensive not earlier than D + 9 or 10. The actual offensive on D-day will thus catch the defence not yet prepared for it.

  On the night D — 1 there would be widespread attacks by undercover forces (some 400 KGB-controlled cells are already deployed) on sui
table targets in the FRG, stiffened by expendable Soviet airborne units. Shortly before first light on D-day airborne formations, making the best use of undercover forces, would seal Hamburg, make good Bremen airfield and seize crossings over the Weser; if possible, over the Rhine as well. The securing of Bremen airfield as an airhead would be indispensable. The success of other airborne operations would be a bonus.

  Just before first light on D-day, and synchronized with the widest possible interference with US space reconnaissance satellites, an air operation of the very highest intensity, using both high explosive and chemical munitions, would be launched simultaneously against the Allied air force bases and control systems and the movement of AFCENT’s land forces to their main defensive positions. When the full shock of this had taken its effect, and a favourable air situation had been achieved, the weight of air effort would be shifted to direct support of a general offensive along the entire AFCENT front, exploiting both normal mass-attack tactics and deep penetration action, the latter intended primarily to pre-empt NATO anti-tank suppressive action. In ground action chemical weapons would be employed at army commanders’ discretion, with the emphasis on nerve gases, persistent or non-persistent. Airborne assaults on suitable targets, especially airfields, air defence sites, headquarters and obstacle crossings would continue. All ground force operations would have maximum tactical air support.

  2 Guards Tank Army with two Polish divisions and some GDR troops would attack on the north of the NORTHAG sector, 3 Shock Army in the south of the same sector, followed by 20 Guards Army, with two GDR divisions under command.

  8 Guards Army would attack on the CENTAG front, objective Frankfurt, 1 Guards Tank Army further south, objective Nurnberg.

  One Polish and two Soviet divisions would move northwards through Schleswig-Holstein into Denmark, supported as necessary. The main thrust into AFNORTH would be out of the Leningrad Military District through Kola in the first instance. The follow-up would be by rail through Finland. All effective resistance in AFNORTH should cease by D + 6, though difficult country may delay the southward advance in Norway.

  By first light on D + l armoured columns in the north must reach the Dortmund-Ems Canal, making good all Weser crossings north of Minden soonest thereafter. In the CENTAG area Giessen must be secured, to develop an attack on the Frankfurt-Mainz complex, already under heavy pressure from the east.

  Air-portable formations operating on the ground out of Bremen airhead should secure river crossings into Holland for rapid consolidation by following armour. Airborne troops will be used to extend the depth of the penetration in Holland. It is imperative to seize the Hilversum radio and television complex intact at the earliest opportunity. By D + 2 resistance in Holland is expected to be minimal. All Holland is to be occupied as far south as the River Waal by D + 6.

  While strong pressure continues on CENTAG from the north-east and east, the main effort will now be in an offensive north to south along the west bank of the Rhine. This is expected to be decisive in the outflanking of CENTAG and destruction of AFCENT.

  There must be maximum exploitation of refugee movement everywhere. Civilian casualties are wholly irrelevant and may even be advantageous. Towns and cities are to be bypassed wherever possible for subsequent attention.

  Berlin will be contained. Its early capitulation can be counted on when AFCENT breaks.

  Resistance can be expected to continue in difficult country, such as the Harz, Spessart, Schwarzwald and Thuringer Wald and the Bavarian high country. This can be masked and ignored. It is also likely to continue in Rhineland and Ruhr cities. Here it must be ruthlessly eliminated.

  NORTHAG can be expected, when its forward defences have been penetrated, first of all to take up positions roughly east and west along the Teutoburger Wald, no doubt hoping to deny crossings across the Lower Rhine by a manoeuvre battle in depth. They will have insufficient troops for this, and there is no hope of their succeeding.

  When the north-south offensive begins to develop NORTHAG can be expected to regroup, in an attempt to check it, on an east-west position west of the Rhine, between Bonn and Maastricht. No chances can be taken here. There will unquestionably be sufficient fresh Warsaw Pact formations and air resources to break through. At least three hitherto uncommitted divisions from 20 Guards Army will be available for a start. Success in this operation will lead to the rolling up of CENTAG from the rear and the collapse of the NATO defence of the Central Region.

  This must be complete by D + 7, at which time the only permissible pockets of continuing resistance (disregarding Berlin, if it has not yet been ordered to capitulate, and Hamburg) will be in the Bavarian Alps.

  On D-day three Soviet divisions, from Hungary and Czechoslovakia, will start moving through Austria into Italy. No Italian resistance is expected. This force may also, if necessary, furnish means of opening a flank attack on CENTAG through Bavaria.

  It is to be assumed that political pressure on the French government, with the guarantee that Warsaw Pact action will proceed no further than the stop-line, will cause France to refrain from hostile action and withdraw II French Corps from Germany.

  The collapse of AFCENT (as well as the elimination of AFNORTH and AFSOUTH) will reduce Allied Command Europe to impotence and cause the disintegration of the Alliance. The United States will accept a ceasefire on or very soon after D + 8, after which discussions can be initiated.

  The neutralization of the Federal Republic of Germany, with the liquidation of hostile elements among the people and such population transfer as may be necessary, together with the dismantling of industrial plant for removal, or its destruction in situ, for all of which instructions have already been prepared, will proceed forthwith.

  The plan for the invasion of the Central Region of NATO by the Warsaw Pact, of which this is a summary, assumed as a necessary condition a high degree of continuing control over the countries and peoples of Eastern Europe. This was quite likely to be threatened.

  CHAPTER 11: Over the Edge

  I: Dispositions in CENTAG

  By 2 August 1985 the four corps composing the Central Army Group in the Central Region of Allied Command Europe were already in their forward position in the CENTAG sector. This ran from near Kassel in the north, at the junction with I Belgian Corps on the right of the Northern Army Group, to the Austrian frontier south of Munchen.

  The four corps of the Central Army Group lay from north to south as follows: III German, V US, VII US, II German.

  II French Corps, stationed with some supporting army troops in south-west Germany, was still not under command to Allied Command Europe. It was not even certain how the French government, given its pronounced left-wing orientation in the recent past, would, in the event of hostilities with the Warsaw Pact, regard its obligations under the Atlantic Treaty. Relations between the French General Staff in Germany and CENTAG, however, were close and cordial, and communication between the two, though discreet, was fairly free.

  At the end of July the personnel of an armoured division, the first of the divisions earmarked for USAREUR, had been flown in from the United States. By nightfall on 2 August it had almost completed the drawing of its prepositioned combat equipment, including more than 300 XM-1 tanks. Some of its units, at least, had fired-in their guns at Grafenwohr before dispersal in the area north-west of Wurzburg, under command to V US Corps.

  It was V US Corps’ sector, running north and south through Fulda, which was considered critical in CENTAG. The Demarcation Line with the East bulges out here in a bold westward curve towards the bend in the Rhine near Frankfurt-am-Main, at its closest no further from Frankfurt than 100 kilometres, with only another forty kilometres to the Rhine. Furthermore, in the hill country of the Thuringer Wald there is an important gap around Fulda itself, with the terrain becoming ever more readily negotiable as it opens down into the Rhine-Main plain. The distances are all short here. There is not much ground to trade for time and little opportunity for mobile operations.

&n
bsp; The area forward of the Fulda valley favoured the defence, offering ample choice of good positions for tanks and ATGW, with considerable depth to their fields of fire. Unfortunately the distance from the Fulda valley to the frontier is no more than fifteen kilometres.

  Behind the Fulda valley to the west is the high mass of the Vogelsberg, to the north the wooded country along the autobahn through Bad Hersfeld to Kassel, to the south the inhospitable terrain of the Hohe Rhon. As a good example of the course of events in a critical sector we shall be giving considerable attention to the action of V US Corps. Its commander’s mission was simple: to keep the Soviet forces east of the Frankfurt plain and as close to the border as possible.

  Lieutenant General Harold J. Selby, Commanding General of V US Corps, was an old hand. Just too young for service in the Second World War, he had got into the Korean campaign right at the end. Later on he had seen plenty of service in armoured cavalry in Vietnam. His total of seven years’ service in Germany had included, besides a tour on the operations staff in HQ AFCENT, command of a regiment and of a division before he was given the command of V Corps in 1983.

  Each of his two original US divisions had been increased in strength to 15,000 men with over 300 tanks each and nearly 500 ATGW. In addition to the armoured cavalry regiment deployed along the border in the corps sector there was a further squadron of armoured cavalry in each division. Besides the self-propelled 155 mm and 8-in divisional artillery, each division also had an additional artillery group and nearly fifty anti-tank helicopters. His third division, newly arrived in Germany but containing many officers and men with previous experience in the theatre, was at lower strength and had not yet shaken down, but it was by no means without promise.

  The two forward divisions knew their areas well. Each was so disposed as to take care of one of the two most likely axes of attack — to the north of the Vogelsberg through Bad Hersfeld and Alsfeld into the plain north of Frankfurt, and south of the Vogelsberg through Fulda and down the Kinzig river valley through Hanau towards Frankfurt. The corps commander expected action on both axes but was convinced that one or the other would be chosen for the main effort. He knew that his overriding task was to establish the direction of the main thrust before the smaller force opposing it was overwhelmed.